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THE HONEST BROKER? CANADA’S
ROLE IN HAITIAN DEVELOPMENT*
MICHELE ZEBICH - KNOS
Abstract
Since the early 1990s Canada has played a key role in Haiti’s development process. The
article explores whether Canada’s foreign policy is becoming more reliant on military-assisted
solutions, including peacekeeping, as a way to solve Haiti’s internal problems and achieve
good governance. The article also examines the Canadian concepts called “Responsibility to
Protect, React and Rebuild” which are linked to humanitarian intervention, and their implication
for Haitian sovereignty. The conclusion cautions against an overly ambitious Canadian devel-
opment policy for Haiti which has little chance of success.
Key words:Canadian Foreign Policy, Sovereignty, Human Rights Development , Economic
Development,  Democracy, Haiti, Canada.
After twenty one years of post-Duvalier turmoil, Haiti still ranks as one of thepoorest countries in the world. While Haiti has benefited from knowing
that it could actually hold presidential elections, as it did in December 1991,
December 1995, November 2000, and February 2006, it still seeks a permanent
transition to peace as well as significant antipoverty efforts. Neither of these
goals has yet to materialize.
Haiti is a country with 80 percent of its citizens under the poverty line, a
2007 per capita GNI of $ 480, and massive unemployment and considerable
infrastructure shortcomings (CIA World Fact book, 2007; Library of Congress
2006; World Bank, 2007). These problems coupled with an increasingly high
cost of living (la vie chère), an unstable public services sector and rising crime
rates, are the main concerns of Haitians today.
Haiti is also in dire environmental straits and suffers from severe degrada-
tion. Deforestation is extensive and continues as Haitians cut trees for firewood.
As a result, most hillsides in this mountainous country are greatly eroded. Ac-
*  A first version of this paper, was presented at the XXVII Latin American Studies
Association Conference held in Montréal, Canada, September 5-8, 2007.
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cording to the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), un-
controlled environmental degradation undermines economic recovery and ham-
pers long-term development. Environmental degradation is especially problem-
atic in the area of food security and lowered crop yields due to soil depletion (An
Assessment of the Current Situation, 1995:84).
Unfortunately, the restoration of President Aristide to power in 1994 with
the help of the U.S. military, did not resolve the grave economic problems facing
most Haitians. As a result, election euphoria of 1990 has given way to resigned
acceptance of the fact that no president, even Aristide, could effect real change
in such a short time. This sentiment is what President Préval, elected in 1995
and again in 2006, must now accept as reality in 2007. Haitian leaders must
tackle the more challenging business of healing their ailing economy against
almost insurmountable odds of corruption and criminality. However, it is not
sufficient to emphasize economic growth as long as such growth follows tradi-
tional patterns of income maldistribution in a country with a small and wealthy
Francophone-elite and an impoverished mass of mostly rural, and largely illiter-
ate, Creole-speakers.
CANADA: STILL THE HONEST BROKER?
Within the context of this challenging backdrop, Canada, has –since the early
1990s– played a key role in many aspects of Haiti’s development and thus ended
what Klepak calls “a century of aloofness” in the Americas (Klepak, 2006:677).
In July 2007 Prime Minister Harper visited Colombia, Chile and Barbados. He
ended his trip in Port-au-Prince, Haiti where he met with President René Préval
and announced that a stable Haiti is vital for the “security of our entire region”
and also emphasized how “he [Préval] can count on our help to make Haiti more
safe [sic] and more prosperous” (BBC Monitoring Service, 2007). What made his
speech reflective of Canada’s new security-enabled development approach is
that he prefaced his introductory sentence with the words “I’m proud to be in
Port-au-Prince today to demonstrate the support of our government for the United
Nations stabilization mission and the 46 Canadians who are serving here” (Prime
Minister Statement, 2007). Addressing initial attention to UN peacekeeping and
security forces instead of Haiti’s own specific needs might be perceived as an
insensitive way to convey Canada’s intentions –especially to his Haitian audi-
ence.
A visit to Cuba on this trip was visibly absent despite its role as contributor
to a Canadian foreign policy made in Ottawa and not Washington (McKenna and
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Kirk, 2007). This Haitian visit was not happenstance. Rather, it was likely a
planned deflection from Canada’s Cuba policy, and a reinforcement of Haiti’s
role as Canada’s “most important long-term development assistance beneficiary
in the Americas” and is the second largest recipient of Canadian foreign aid after
Afghanistan (Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 2007).
While Haitian relations are often linked to the United States as a result of its
closer geographic proximity, 1915-1934 military occupation, control of its cus-
toms’ houses until 1941 (Skidmore and Smith, 2005:336) and Miami and New
York-centered migration, Canada’s foreign policy plays a significant role in fa-
cilitating political and economic development within this francophone and Créole-
speaking country. Canada provides many millions of dollars worth of foreign
assistance to Haitian development. However, these efforts often go unnoticed,
especially by the U.S. public, as Canada conducts its low-keyed and less flamboy-
ant-style of foreign policy in the poorest and most politically tumultuous country
of the Americas.
The United States is associated with attention-grabbing, and often negative,
claims toward, or perceptions of, Haiti. These include those made by the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency (CIA) and a member of Congress concerning former
president Jean-Bertrand Aristide’s psychological stability, as well as media im-
ages of capsized boats loaded with desperate Haitian refugees in search of a
better life (McCoy, 2000:378). On the contrary, Canada’s Haiti image is por-
trayed in a more tempered light in which Haitian immigrants arrive legally by
plane already speaking at least one official language (French). Furthering this
image is the current Canadian Governor-General, Michaëlle Jean, who is also a
Haitian émigré and an honored official at President Préval’s inauguration. En-
gagement between the two countries is seemingly positive with little of the ten-
sions so noticeable between Haiti and the United States. Canada’s Haitian popu-
lation, while located mainly in Québec, is thus an effective source for keeping
Haiti on the front burner in Ottawa.
To the south, Haitian-American interests are overshadowed by U.S. preoccu-
pation with Cuba. This is a direct consequence of savvy maneuvering and use of
the U.S. political system by Cuban-Americans. Of course, places like Miami,
and to a lesser extent, New York are home to not only Cubans, but other Span-
ish-speaking Latinos. This Latino dominance diminishes the attention paid to
Haitian voices for political change. Haitian-Americans are also notably more
divided and subtle about their political views than are Cuban-Americans who
exhibit strong emotional dislike for the Cuban government and are quick to
vilify Fidel Castro, especially when television cameras are rolling. Haitian-Ameri-
cans rarely get such coverage.
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Yet, as Canada incorporates the military pillar into its development policy
toward Haiti, and stresses hemispheric security as Harper is wont to do, we
must ask whether this idyllic image described above is still an accurate one. Is
Canada’s foreign policy becoming more receptive to foreign military solutions
to Haiti’s internal security problems connected to political violence, gangs and
narcotrafficking? And, what effect does this policy have on sovereignty and inde-
pendent decision making, concepts so greatly cherished by Canada? Before we
seek answers to these questions, an explanation of Haiti’s overall development
dilemma is in order so that we can place Canadian policy in its actual working
environment.
BACKGROUND TO HAITI’S DILEMMA OF DEVELOPMENT
Haiti and the Many Faces of Development
Many scholars criticize the neoliberal development model that advocates growth
through a free trade arena that favors the North and sound –according to neoliberal
standards–, domestic economic policies. They state that the social and political
costs are too great. These policies are often associated with structural adjust-
ments that attempt to drastically cut public spending, reduce the burden of a
bloated bureaucracy, and eliminate unprofitable state enterprises in order to
generate needed revenue. Korten uses the term people-centered development
(Korten, 1992:61-66). Hirschman also focuses on grass-roots empowerment and
expressed “a revulsion against the worship of the ‘gross national product’ and of
the ‘rate of growth’ as unique arbiters of economic and human progress”
(Hirschman, 1991:39).
Canada’s foreign policy toward Haiti appears very compatible with such
people-centered development models, but what distinguishes it from Korten and
Hirschman’s models is the recent militarily-reliant component for achieving its
development objectives. Prior to the 1990s, Canadian foreign policy exhibited a
greater willingness to work with all types of governments, including enemies of
the United States such as the Nicaraguan Sandinistas. However, as we will see in
later sections, Canada has altered parts of its foreign policy framework within
which it structures its support of Haiti’s development process.
Korten takes issue with those who stress that first the economic pie must
grow before more people can benefit from it. Instead, he states “people-centered
development says take care of equity first, provide people the means to make
productive use of their assets, and appropriate growth will take care of itself ”
(Korten, 1992:65). This is unrealistic in a country such as Haiti for most people
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cannot make productive use of their assets because they have so few tangible
assets. In order to productively use assets, Haiti’s economy must first acquire
enough capital investment to produce jobs and expand access to credit so that
individuals have the opportunity to save and develop assets. For “progress” to
occur, there must be investment in social infrastructure that yields sound macro-
economic results and also nourishes personal needs. Investing in health care,
transportation systems, and education to name but three areas, can enhance
people’s quality of life and foster economic growth. Canada invests in all three.
Why was this not done previously in Haiti? Lundahl answers this for us by
stating:
Political life became a concern for small cliques that invested their resources in
devices that would allow them to capture or retain the highest office and the spoils
that came with it. The government apparatus turned into a mafia –a kleptocracy–
that milked the treasury, and ultimately the nation, in order to obtain private
incomes . . . The very essence of the political process has been the extraction of
rents with the aid of the state apparatus. It would seem strange if the same kind of
logic were not present among those who are today’s pretenders to the throne...
(Lundahl, 1992:401-402).
Thus, inadequate infrastructure and outdated facilities are often the result of
institutionalized kleptocracy which siphons money to corrupt individuals rather
than spending it on needed improvements. This was all too evident, especially in
the past. At Haiti’s port facilities, for example, container ships in the 1990s
usually paid US $30,000-60,000 more for docking in Haiti than at any other
Caribbean port (Cordoba, 1996). One wonders where the extra money went, if
not to port improvements that are not apparent to outside observers.
To facilitate Haiti’s development process, as Canada and others recognize,
one must first tackle numerous deficiencies, such as institutional and gover-
nance structures, general infrastructure, education and healthcare simultaneously.
Second, one must trust that forces for change both internal and external will
have a sufficient impact to counteract the traditional kleptocracy described by
Lundahl and others (Maingot, 1988; Dupuy, 1997). This cannot be done using
optimum investments in an ideal setting; rather, it must be done with full aware-
ness that current investment levels are insufficient to improve quality of life in
the short term. Yet, Haiti has no other option. Achieving the perception of “growth
mode” economy amid a slowly improving infrastructure might generate momen-
tum and attract additional investment –as long as it does not implode in another
one of its political bust cycles. Gradual progress is what external supporters like
Canada hope will occur.
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WHAT IS THE PROBLEM?
Haiti today is at the crossroads of two major problem areas which are connected
to improving the economy, furthering socio-economic and human rights devel-
opment and enabling good governance. These areas include (1) effective politi-
cal leadership and institutions; and, (2) law and order. Without successful im-
provements in these arenas, it is unlikely that Haiti’s economy will improve
thereby making reduction in poverty unlikely. This explains why Canada had
adopted the Responsibility to Protect framework (which I will detail in a later
section) as a comprehensive approach to achieving development goals. It is, after
all, a reduction in Haiti’s massive poverty that is the foremost development
objective, and impediment, to democracy and good governance. Not surpris-
ingly, the 2005 Report of the UN Security Council Mission to Haiti noted that
most Haitians with whom UN representatives talked
. . . identified themselves with the statement of a Transitional Government official
that poverty is ‘the underlying root of unrest in Haiti,’ as well as the consensus view
that there could be no genuine stability in the country without the strengthening of
its economy. Both the Haitian interlocutors and the mission stressed the need for a
long-term strategy to promote development and combat poverty (UN Security
Council, S/2005/302, 2005).
The “wait and see” period, so typical of private investors before committing
to a new investment, will be extended over many more years if Haiti is unable to
demonstrate improvement in these areas. Economic development can easily be
thwarted by these non-economic factors. For economic improvement to begin, it
becomes necessary to take a multi-prong approach and tackle a host of sub-
problems simultaneously within these two main categories.
The first area of concern is that of political leadership and institutions. Haiti’s
democratic history is practically non-existent and achievement of political sta-
bility, as expressed through democratic and sustained leadership change, is not
an easy task. Whether Haiti will continue to follow the democratic rule of law is
questionable given past tradition. The most recent example of democratic lead-
ership lapses occurred not that long ago in September 1991 when President
Jean-Bertrand Aristide was overthrown in a military coup and again in February
2004 when Aristide was ushered out of Haiti –this time by foreign, and mostly
U.S., forces (CIA World Fact Book, 2007; Foreign Affairs and International Trade
Canada, 2007).
Restoration of Aristide after his first coup took place in 1994, only after the
United States was on the brink of invading Haiti to achieve this objective through
force. Access to power in the Haitian political arena and the public sector in
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general has always been based on a clientelist structure whose purpose was to
reward those astute enough to align with the right patron in order to find a
comfortable niche within the public sector. Government that is responsive to its
citizens was, and seemingly still is, absent. Haitian government has traditionally
been most responsive to those lucky enough to be employed, or connected in
some manner, to its institutions (Oakley and Dziedzic, 1996).
Dupuy describes Haiti as a “prebendary state” in which the political regime
and its office holders benefit from politics much as entrepreneurs benefit from
private business. That is, they derive not only salary, but also other financial
benefits such as those obtained from bribes or outright siphoning of public funds
(Dupuy, 1997:21). Lundahl (1992) and others refer to the Haitian state as preda-
tory, or a kleptocracy (Maingot, 1988). Whether prebendary or predatory, the
Haitian political system has traditionally functioned as a means for self-enrich-
ment in an economy too feeble to provide much private sector entrepreneurial
opportunity to all but a few. Corruption within state institutions has changed
very little today (Moreau, 2006:80). The only difference is that foreign develop-
ment projects are now more reliant on private, nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs) for much of the project management.
A civic minded bureaucracy bent on the efficient delivery of public services
thus became the exception and not the rule. Publicly controlled basic infrastruc-
tures such as communications, power, health and education suffered as a result.
The picture painted here is that of a public sector wrought with self-aggrandize-
ment and general inefficiency. Today, few would argue that such traits must be
corrected before meaningful development will occur. To attract investment, es-
pecially in the secondary –or industrial– sector communications and power sup-
ply (i.e., electricity) must improve and function on a regular basis. This is not
the case today where most Haitian cities still experience near daily power out-
ages.
Let us not forget that infrastructure improvements will also benefit the mass
of impoverished Haitians who have come to expect little from public services.
Haiti’s political shortcomings are widely recognized in the international com-
munity and in Canada, in particular, as a major obstacle to development. In
order to improve the Haitian economy, the international lending community is
united in what steps Haiti needs to take. For better or worse, these steps follow
a liberal, free-market approach that include privatization of state owned enter-
prises, responsible government spending, and a reduction of the bloated public
sector workforce. These are standard “structural adjustments” known all too
well in other parts of the developing world and remain unchanged from what
was requested of Haiti in the 1980s. These bitter pill remedies have become
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wrapped up into current reforms of Haiti’s political institutions yet also provide
fuel for in-fighting among Haiti’s political parties and parliamentary stalemates.
What is demanded is nothing less than a total redefinition of the Haitian
State. Outside forces, including Canada, are asking Haiti to produce (1) demo-
cratic transfer of political power; (2) a more honest and pared down public
sector; and, (3) the privatization of enterprises that have benefited from
longstanding political patronage. In short, they are asking Haiti to abandon its
past behavior and redefine its traditional clientelist methods. Expecting this to
occur in ten or twenty years is unrealistic –especially in a country once called
part of the fifth world by Mother Teresa (Keller, 2005:35). It is reasonable to
expect that corruption and prebendary use of the state will not abruptly disap-
pear. Only with the growth of meaningful, private sector employment opportu-
nities will Haitians alter a view of the State as chief provider.
By 2004, the very reforms needed to improve and enhance Haiti’s political
institutions proved politically volatile and further destabilized its leadership while
President Aristide resorted to more heavy-handed tactics to quell his opponents.
Without visible economic improvements in an era of rising expectations, Presi-
dent René Préval faces potential discontent in his second term, just as he did
when elected in 1995. He too could easily be undermined by mass demonstra-
tions and parliamentary rivals. Indeed, paramilitary revolts, student demonstra-
tions and parliamentary division ultimately led to Aristide’s departure from of-
fice in 2004.
Under the second problem area of law and order, judicial reform and the
successful operation of Haiti’s civilian police force must be demonstrated before
significant investment into Haiti’s economy will occur. Instances of gross abuse
and human rights violations abound during the military regime of General Raoul
Cédras (1991-1994), yet allegations of similar actions were also rampant during
Aristide’s second term in office –and continue today.
Since great abuse was perpetrated at the hands of the military and military-
controlled police, the first step was to abolish the military and train a civil
police force –yet disarming the Haitian army (FADH) never occurred, which
partially explains how insurgents created so much turmoil in 2004. To be effec-
tive, such a police force must also be supported by a meaningful judiciary. This
is why judicial training, administrative supervision, and courtroom security be-
came objects of concern following the removal of General Cédras and are still
part of the development agenda today (An Assessment of the Current Situation,
1995:78).
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CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY AND THE HAITIAN CASE
Foreign Policy Background
Equipped with a new variation to its traditional foreign policy, Canada has stepped,
in recent years, into this turbulent Caribbean context. The policy objectives seek
to promote democracy and good governance, support development, alleviate
poverty, and enhance Canadian as well as Haitian security. Canada was known
for its foreign policy role as honest broker, one in which political leanings were
often overlooked in favor of accomplishing social and economic development
goals. While the United States has a long history of unilateral Central American
and Caribbean economic and military invasions and occupations, Canada’s record
is devoid of such incursions. In the post-World War II era Canada also stressed a
multilateral approach to problem solving in the global arena while the United
States is known for its strong critique of the United Nations in particular.
A middle power is how Howard and Donnelly (1990) described Canada’s
foreign policy orientation. This depiction still holds true today.
Canada is, or strives to be, a middle power in world politics. Its chief preoccupa-
tions are to expand its political influence and to diversify its trade links while
maintaining its membership in the western alliance and its extremely important
friendly relations with the United States. A principal means to this end is to project
an image of tolerance and concern for the Third World [and] by acting as an
“honest broker”... between North and South (Howard and Donnelly, 1990:9).
While the United States was in the throes of a Cold War and fighting 1980s
era, pro-Communist governments directly as in Grenada, or by proxy, in Nicara-
gua, Canada stuck to its foreign policy of moderation and balance. Balance was
needed to keep the U.S. superpower content and convinced that its northern
neighbor sided with the anti-Communist approach so evident in the North At-
lantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Canada was, and is still, a NATO member.
Nevertheless, while the United States maintained a predominantly East-West
approach to its foreign policy, Canada pursued a North-South approach –one
that emphasized development and human rights unconnected to communism.
This notion of balance translated into a Canadian policy that seemingly took
no sides despite its NATO membership; and instead, sought what was best for the
achievement of noble societal goals, i.e. poverty alleviation. This enabled Canada
to interact, for example, with Sandinista forces as the United States actively
funded and supported the Contra rebels in Nicaragua during the 1980s. As long
as Canada balanced its NATO commitments accordingly, it would not incur the
wrath of its southern neighbor and largest trading partner. Thus, Canada became
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known for foreign policy based on an intermediary and non-threatening role, or
honest broker, aimed at solving socio-economic problems without becoming
embroiled in Cold War political machinations. In other words, Canada played
both sides of the fence –and this worked well to portray it as the nice, non-
confrontational honest broker living next to a dogmatic and arrogant neighbor.
Consensus seeking thus became a proud Canadian value in the Cold War as it
had been in Canada’s past history.
While not officially pro-Sandinista during the 1980s, it did support the legal
Nicaraguan government and sent over $12 million in 1987-1988 to further its
development and humanitarian goals Canada also supported multilateral efforts
during those war-torn years to achieve lasting peace and bring an end to Central
America’s civil wars. In 1986 it vigorously condemned U.S. actions to mine
Nicaraguan harbors and, by 1990, Canada had given $ 580,000 to the Nicara-
guan government for its presidential election effort, balloting supplies, and elec-
toral media campaigns (Howard and Donnelly, 1990:8). Canada was clearly
trying to project three foreign policy elements: its own sovereignty vis-à-vis the
United States, multilateralism, and tolerant concern for less developed countries
(LDCs). As noted by Howard and Donnelly there were “strong nationalist rea-
sons for Canada to have an independent foreign policy toward Nicaragua, as it
has had toward Cuba since the Castro revolution” (p. 10). This independent
attitude, was good for domestic consumption and played well among Canadian
voters. It also explains why Canada was not a member of the Organization of
American States (OAS) during the Cold War. Yet, as I will explain in later para-
graphs, this changed noticeably in January 1990 when Canada joined the OAS.
This event helped shift Canada away from a role of balance to one of expanded
engagement –including support for an international military presence– this time
in Haiti.
Haiti has not changed, but Canada’s foreign policy approach to the
hemisphere’s poorest country has evolved from an economic development, anti-
poverty model to include achievement of political stability and good governance.
These two latter objectives would be helped along by multilateral forces, on an
as-needed basis. Ironically, the term as-needed appears to have shifted to a per-
manent basis. Nevertheless, Canada has not altered its strategic world-view as
purveyor of tolerance and concern for LDCs. Instead, it changed its tactics. While
one development policy goal is still poverty alleviation, Canada has expanded
the acceptable methods with which to achieve this goal. This came about as
multinational organizations, particularly the United Nations, altered its view of
the mechanics of multilateral intervention for humanitarian causes and sover-
eignty. For better or worse, Canada’s multilateral policy ironically intersected,
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and came into closer harmony with, the more interventionist policy followed by
the United States toward Haiti.
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT AND HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
In a 2005 Pew Research Center survey, almost ninety-four percent of Canadian
respondents believe that Canada is “well-liked” by other countries (Pew Global
Attitudes Project, 2005). This attitude may derive from Canada’s multilateral
approach in which it considers itself a friend of the world –especially the Third
World, and countries like Haiti in particular. As the world’s problems evolved
in the 1990s and early twenty-first century toward post-Cold War threats related
to failed or fragile states’ inability to resolve their internal problems, working
for the common good in a multilateral team became enmeshed with the use of
military intervention.
After OAS urging, the United States invaded Haiti in October 1994 to facili-
tate the successful routing of General Cédras and his coup plotters from power
and the return of Jean-Bertrand Aristide to the presidency. For Canada to justify
its shift to multilateral military support as a tool for development and demo-
cratic governance, it had to create and conceptualize a framework that fit its new
approach. This twenty-first century approach came to be known as the 3-Ds:
diplomacy, defense and development and not only projected a stern front against
terrorists, but also incorporated the military into Canada’s traditional develop-
ment policies for the developing world (Thompson, 2005). The military was
needed because, unlike the Sandinista example, Canada no longer tolerated prob-
lem governments of countries whose citizens it was trying to help. This is cer-
tainly true of Haiti under Aristide after his return to the presidency in 1994, and
again, after his 2000 reelection.
Specifically, the 3-Ds rely on a more complex framework developed by
Canada’s International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS)
and contained in The Responsibility to Protect report issued in December 2001.
This report spells out how –and why– Canada should intervene to protect the
well-being of those in need, despite the possible conflict of sovereignty rights.
While the report mentions examples from around the world, this paper confines
itself to how Canada’s policies relate to the Haitian example only.
Canada’s responsibility to protect policy is based on the well-recognized
international legal principle called humanitarian intervention which states that,
despite recognition of sovereignty, states have a right to intervene militarily in
another sovereign state, provided humanitarian disaster warrants such interven-
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tion. The report thus reiterates the “question of when, if ever, it is appropriate
for states to take coercive –and in particular military– action, against another
state for the purpose of protecting people at risk in that other state” (Interna-
tional Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 2001:VII).
The answer to this question is a resounding yes to multilateral intervention:
“sovereign states have a responsibility to protect their own citizens from avoid-
able catastrophe –from mass murder and rape, from starvation– but that when
they are unwilling or unable to do so, that responsibility must be borne by the
broader community of states” (International Commission on Intervention and
State Sovereignty, 2001:VIII).
Linking to the multilateral aspect, the report goes on to clarify that “where a
population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency,
repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt
or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsi-
bility to protect” (International Commission on Intervention and State Sover-
eignty, 2001:XI). This language provides Canada with a broad brush with which
to justify intervention and diminishes its traditional honest broker role which
implies that Canada will not take sides.
CALLING IN THE MILITARY
Clearly Canada took sides, and reserved the right, for example, to decide whether
the Haitian government in 2004 was unable to halt the insurgency that gained
momentum on February 5 in Gonaïves and was led by former members of the
disbanded military, Guy Philippe and Louis-Jodel Chamblain. Canada was not
the only state to take this view which was shared by many in the international
community including the United States. The solution to this internal Haitian
political problem was deemed to require intervention just as it had in 1994 to
restore Aristide to office. This time the outcome would be very different and, on
February 29, 2004, President Aristide was ushered by U.S. forces to a plane
destined for the Central African Republic while Canadian forces secured the
airport (Engler and Fenton, 2005:19). These foreign forces acted under Multina-
tional Interim Force (February-June, 2004) auspices and were authorized by UN
Security Council Resolution 1529 (UN Press Release SC/8015, 2004). It ap-
peared that Aristide was the victim of those who were ostensibly trying to save
his life. He claims, however, that he was forced out in a coup d’état by U.S.
troops and did not abandon Haiti willingly. Needless to say, Aristide takes a dim
view of his current exile, holds Canada partially responsible, and stated in a
2005 interview from South Africa that
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What we need is to move from elections to elections, not coup d’état to coup d’état
. . . The United States, France, Canada and so many others should do something to
repair, if they can, what they did. Because what they did is a crime (Aristide inter-
view with Amy Goodman, quoted in Engler and Fenton, 2005:20).
The Canadian foreign policy pillar of supporting “good governance” was
certainly not met in the second Aristide administration, and international pa-
tience was wearing thin. This pillar focused on respect for human rights, demo-
cratic procedure and a functioning and responsive bureaucracy (Keating 2001:210).
Aristide was no pristine leader and his 2000 reelection was marred by allega-
tions that voter turnout was at a mere ten percent. The voice of this former priest
was becoming more isolated from his citizenry and, by late 2003, opposition
political parties, Fanmi Lavalas break-off party OPL, and other civil society groups
called for his resignation (United Nations, MINUSTAH, 2007).
On January 31, 2004, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) devised a Prior
Action Plan to facilitate crisis mediation. This plan was followed by an actual
implementation plan created by the Group of Six which included Canada,
CARICOM, the European Union, France, the OAS and the United States. Canada
was a player in this attempt to stave off more violence and thus conveyed a
graduated and tempered approach – one that values diplomacy first before mili-
tary action, in keeping with its 3-D policy. Aristide also agreed to the plan which
called for reforms and a new cabinet. By doing so he would be able to serve out
his term in office. However, opposition leaders would not agree and the chaos
escalated until insurgents marched to take over the capital, Port-au-Prince (United
Nations, MINUSTAH, 2007).
In early morning February 29, 2004 Aristide resigned. By the evening of
February 29, the Permanent Representative of Haiti to the United Nations, act-
ing under the auspices of interim president Boniface Alexandre, formally re-
quested UN assistance, which was already on the ground by the 29th. Yet, mili-
tary involvement at the last minute, rather than before, as Aristide requested, did
not go unnoticed by Engler and Fenton (2005). They argue that this was a planned
action and ask why troops were involved at the coup’s culmination to oust Aristide
rather than days sooner (Engler and Fenton 2005:18-19). Earlier assistance might
have kept Aristide in office, something that many powers did not want. Alexandre’s
request included not only military assistance, but also economic aid, and autho-
rized an international force to enter Haiti. Through UN Security Council Reso-
lution 1529 the Multilateral Interim Force (MIF) was created and aimed at main-
taining order and conflict avoidance in the short term – but only after Aristide
was out of the picture.
In April 2004 Security Council Resolution 1542 called for the creation of the
United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) and by June of that
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year, MIF was folded into this more complex entity. MINUSTAH’s mission has
gradually increased from maintaining law and order in the absence of a well-
trained police force to one in which “MINUSTAH remained committed to mobi-
lizing resources for projects that make an immediate difference in people’s lives”
(United Nations, MINUSTAH, 2007). Its mission in Haiti has been extended since
its inception and current authorization (S/RES/1743) expires on October 15,
2007, with the likelihood that it will be renewed.
Within a multilateral context, Canada’s foreign policy thus justified interven-
tion into a fragile state like Haiti after the 2004 uprising. The presumption is
that the Aristide government was unable, or unwilling, to stop the violence and
even provoked more violence by targeting opponents. This situation prevented
Aristide’s government from helping his people, many of whom are in dire eco-
nomic straits. The end result was military assistance (intervention?) by the United
States, France and Canada which resulted in President Aristide being ushered
out of Haiti and taken to exile in Africa. With an armed international stabiliza-
tion force (MINUSTAH) in place, Canada can say that it used diplomacy first by
supporting the Prior Action Plan, and when it did not succeed, only then did it
agree to a military solution to quell the violence and create at least a semblance
of good governance.
Now that MINUSTAH is present in Haiti, Canada’s third pillar –development
can be viably tackled. Canada not only welcomes MINUSTAH’s role, but also
actively contributes military and police personnel to its effort. At the height of
the crisis in March 2004 there were 450 Canadian military personnel in Haiti
while the number has decreased to 46 by July 2007 (National Defence, 2006;
Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, 2007).
If we examine long term United Nations military involvement in Haiti, as
Table 1 reveals, we notice that Canada is a continuous participant and has,
unfailingly, contributed military and/or police personnel to each UN peacekeep-
ing mission to Haiti. This is in keeping with its 3-D view of foreign policy, but
also raises questions about an overextended foreign outreach that may have other
motives.
Keating (2001) cautions Canadians against “taking up the ‘White Man’s bur-
den’” and notes that they are generally wary of foreign intervention and/or occu-
pation, even for democracy promotion. He reminds us that Canadian foreign
policy makers have traditionally avoided such foreign entanglements lest they be
perceived as overly pushy and resemble their southern neighbor. Yet Keating also
recognizes that “in the post-Cold War environment Canadians in and out of
public office have been infected with the crusading spirit and have decided that
promoting democracy and related noble causes such as human security is indeed
a worthwhile activity deserving of official support and public resources” (Keating,
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UN MISSION
United Nations
Mission
in Haiti
(UNMIH)
United Nations
Support
Mission in Haiti
(UNSMIH)
United Nations
Transition
Mission in Haiti
(UNTMIH)
United Nations
Civilian Police
Mission in Haiti
(MIPONUH)
United Nations
Stabilization
Mission in Haiti
(MINUSTAH)
DURATION
September
1993-
June
1996
July 1996-
July 1997
August-
November
1997
December
1997-
March
2000
June
2004-
Present
CONTRIBUTORS OF MILITARY OR POLICE BY COUNTRY
Algeria, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas,
Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Canada,
Dijbouti, France, Guatemala, Guinea Bissau, Guyana,
Honduras, India, Ireland, Jamaica, Jordan, Mali,
Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Pakistan,
Philippines, Russian Federation, Saint Kitts and
Nevis, Saint Lucia, Suriname, Togo, Trinidad and
Tobago, Tunisia, United States
Algeria, Bangladesh, Benin, Canada, Dijbouti,
France, India, Mali, Pakistan, Russian Federation,
Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, United States
Argentina, Benin, Canada, France, India, Mali,
Niger, Senegal, Togo, Tunisia, United States
Argentina, Benin, Canada, France, India, Mali,
Niger, Senegal, Togo, Tunisia, United States
Military Personnel:
Argentina, Bolivia, Brasil, Canada, Chile, Croatia,
Ecuador, France, Guatemala, Jordan, Nepal,
Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Phillipines, Sri Lanka,
United States and Uruguay
Police Personnel:
Argentina, Benin, Brasil, Burkina Faso, Cameroon,
Canada, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Egypt, El
Salvador, France, Guinea, Jordan, Madagascar,
Mali, Mauritius, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan,
Philippines, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda,
Senegal, Spain, Togo, Turkey, United States,
Uruguay and Yemen.
TABLE 1. STATE PARTICIPATION IN UNITED NATIONS MILITARY MISSIONS TO HAITI
Source: United Nations, MINUSTAH, Background Fact & Figures, 2007, http://www.un.org/Depts/
dpko/missions/minustah/facts.html (accessed July 14, 2007).
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2001:208). It appears that the end of the Cold War had a great influence on
Canadian foreign policy and sparked the idealistic desire to facilitate democracy,
human rights, and anti-poverty policies. After all, many scholars and practitio-
ners exhibited this renewed hope in democracy’s expansion; and, Francis
Fukyama’s book, The End of History and the Last Man (1992), further encour-
aged policy makers toward this end.
THE RESPONSIBILITY TO REBUILD... AND PREVENT
Canadian Electoral Support
The previous section explained Canada’s defense, or reactive, portion of its
foreign policy which includes the (1) responsibility to prevent; (2) responsibility
to react; and, (3) responsibility to rebuild (International Commission on Inter-
vention and State Sovereignty, 2001:XI). Let us now focus on Canada’s role in
rebuilding Haiti, otherwise, referred to as development assistance. However,
rebuilding also includes prevention which addresses the root causes of poverty
and political unrest that often lead to violence and ensuing intervention in Haiti.
Prevention can conceptually include not only economic development projects,
but also expert Canadian assistance to facilitate fair and free elections
The end of the Cold War era also explains why Canada was now able to join
a regional organization which now focused on democracy building and not the
U.S. dominated anti-Communist agenda. Canada officially joined the OAS in
January 1990 and, by June 1990, supported creation of the Unit for the Promo-
tion of Democracy (UPSD), known to those of us who worked under its tutelage
in Haiti simply as the Democracy Unit. Most notably, the Democracy Unit was
responsible for coordinating, aiding and sending observers to Haiti’s 1990 presi-
dential election which is considered to be Haiti’s first free election. Keating
reminds us that former Canadian ambassador, John Graham, was its first direc-
tor (Keating, 2001:211).
During the 1991 elections, Chief Electoral Officer Pierre-F. Coté served as
head of Québec’s Electoral Mission to Haiti, and was named coordinator of the
Democracy Unit’s foreign election observers mission to Haiti and Personal Rep-
resentative to the OAS Secretary-General. This Québec-led OAS mission also pro-
vided the bulk of Canadian assistance to Haiti’s Provisional Electoral Council,
known by its French-language acronym, CEP (Chief Electoral Officer of Québec/
Directeur Général des Elections du Québec, 1991). Table 2. reveals the numer-
ous election missions while Québec’s electoral assistance was a natural fit with
francophone Haiti. As we see from Table 2. there is a longstanding French-
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Canadian role since Haiti’s first, albeit unsuccessful, attempt at presidential
elections in 1987. That first election came after the 1986 coup against president-
for-life Jean-Claude (Baby Doc) Duvalier.
TABLE 2. HAITI MISSIONS CONDUCTED BY THE CHIEF ELECTORAL OFFICER OF QUÉBEC
Source: Chief Electoral Officer of Québec (2007) Liste des missions à l’étranger par année
financière. http://www.electionsquebec.qc.ca/fr/missions.asp?t=m&r=a&annee=tous&tb=o
(Accessed July 25, 2007).
Electoral support from the Canadian government extended into the 2006
Haitian elections. Elections Canada, which is responsible for federal and pro-
vincial elections management, was selected to oversee Canada’s observer mis-
sion to these elections (Elections Canada, 2007). The International Mission for
Monitoring Haitian Elections (IMMHE) was established on June 16, 2005, dur-
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DATE
11/1987
3/1990-2/1991
1/1993-10/1993
1/1997-2/1997
7/2004-7/2004
8/2004-9/2004
MISSION GOAL
Observer
Coordinator of
OAS Mission
and Personal
Representative
to the OAS
Secretary-
General
Technical
Assistance
Analysis of
Haitian
Diaspora voting
in Haitian
Elections
Donors
Conference
on Haiti
Legal
Consultation
on electoral laws
ORGANIZATIONAL AUSPICES
N/A
Organization
of American
States -OAS
OAS
Québec Ministry
of International
Relations
Québec Ministry
of International
Relations
Canadian International
Development Agency
(CIDA)
TYPE OF MISSION
Observer Mission
Technical Assistance
Mission
Technical Assistance
Mission
Analysis and
Evaluation
Mission
Meeting of Experts
Technical Assistance
Mission
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ing the Montréal International Conference on Haiti and completed its mission
to observe the February 7, 2006 elections. INNHE was later replaced by the
Canadian Mission for Accompanying Haitian Elections (CMAHE) and Jean-Pierre
Kingsley, Chief Electoral Officer of Canada, was selected as head of CMAHE
which sent two observer teams to Haiti. To facilitate sound electoral processes,
CMAHE observations and expertise were shared with Haiti’s Provisional Elec-
toral Council (CEP). As such, CMAHE characterized its work as making a “sig-
nificant contribution to Haiti’s long-term development, particularly with re-
spect to the development of democratic practices (Elections Canada, 2007:1).
FINANCIAL COMMITMENT TO DEVELOPMENT
The Montréal International Conference on Haiti (June 16-17, 2005) was a bilat-
eral endeavor co-sponsored by the governments of Haiti and Canada with the goal
of ensuring democratic elections in Haiti and support for socio-economic im-
provements which would take Haiti beyond the transitional government period
(Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, 2007). The Montreal Conference
was a later iteration of what was recognized in the July 2004 International Donors
Conference held in Washington, D.C. In that conference the international donor
community committed to spend $400 million to achieve development goals set
forth in the Interim Cooperation Framework, 2004-2006 (ICF, 2004). The ICF was
formulated by the United Nations, European Commission, World Bank, and Inter-
American Bank in consultation with the Interim Haitian government and forms the
basis for the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) projects in Haiti.
CANADA-HAITI COOPERATION
CIDA’s relationship with Haiti is based not only on the ICF, but also on a past
development track record stemming as far back as 1968. By 1994-2004, Canada
provided more than $ Cdn 600 million, or $US 564 million, in development
assistance to Haiti (CIDA, 2004:6). According to CIDA, development assistance
focuses on the following ICF-related pillars:
- Political governance issues including security, policing, prisons, and elec-
toral processes;
- Institutional and local development, land-use planning and decentralization;
- Economic revitalization, jobs creation and infrastructure development;
- Improvement of public services –education, water, sanitation, and health
(CIDA, 2006).
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Projects are ambitious if only in a numerical sense and range from making
micro-loans to 100 women in the communities of Haute St-Marc, Goyavier and
Betrand, to vaccinating 384,344 children against diphtheria, tuberculosis and
polio (CIDA, 2007b). Many of the projects are small scale and reveal very con-
crete outputs. This specificity results from lessons learned in the field; that is, to
keep project design “simple and well-defined . . . with modest objectives” (World
Bank, 2006).
Despite the urge to expect only small advances, the whirlwind of interna-
tional conferences in which Haiti is discussed as if it were a sick patient await-
ing major surgery, contributed to what CIDA (2004) calls a donor-driven agenda
imposed on the Haitian government. This exuberance for pouring massive
amounts of money and expertise into Haiti, often with conditions attached,
resulted in “poor commitment and ineffective implementation” (CIDA, 2004:11).
Lack of visible change can also contribute to donor fatigue which may cause
donors to remove their support altogether. After the contentious 2000 elections,
conditionality was imposed with the intention to promote transparency, and
sound economic and fiscal policies. CIDA (2004) questions whether such condi-
tionality actually worked especially since, by February 2004, the Haitian govern-
ment experienced some of the worst political turmoil since the1991 coup.
CIDA projects are administered either through the Haitian government as part-
ner, or, through an NGO. Partnering with a government noted for mismanagement
and corruption poses obvious questions of efficacy, but the proliferation of NGO
links to CIDA projects raises its own set of concerns. The myriad of NGOs involved
in development projects resembles a shot gun approach that, if left unchecked,
may also not yield the desired results. Yet, NGO partnerships will continue to be
tapped as long as Haiti’s governmental institutions exhibit inefficient and corrupt
practices and NGOs remain closely linked to civil society in donors’ eyes.
Shamsie (2004) argues that reliance on NGOs is productive because it not
only helps development goals, but also fosters democracy. As representatives of
civil society, NGOs nurture democratic practice in a country whose elite ma-
nipulated such groups to keep democracy at bay and bolster a system that fa-
vored their well being –not that of the masses (Shamsie, 2004:1106). However,
beyond their democracy building and development function we must keep their
activities in perspective and remind ourselves that they are unelected actors whose
own transparency may be harder to monitor and whose internal infrastructure
may rely too heavily on the whim of international donors and non-profit founda-
tions who fund them. As such, they must be regarded as a vital actor, but not a
substitute for the creation of sound public institutions.
Compounding this issue is the confusion surrounding uncoordinated donor ac-
tivities where USAID, for example, may fund private sector project delivery while
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another donor funds a public ministry to do the same work (CIDA, 2004:13). Project
duplication is the result, can be costly, and is of little didactic value to Haitians
who are watching the outsider experts who purport to know how to help Haiti.
Despite CIDA’s resolve to work with Haiti, its frustration clearly shows by its
depiction of Canada-Haiti cooperation as a “difficult partnership” (CIDA, 2004).
The United States’ historical dealings with Haiti coupled with an unpopular
military occupation from 1915-1934 resulted in rather low expectations for that
country. On the contrary, Haiti’s lack of sustained progress despite numerous
international financial, security and other efforts, visibly wears on the more
idealistic Canadian development agency.
Perhaps CIDA thought its commitment and sincerity might somehow be suffi-
cient to convince Haitians to make the projects succeed, thus leading it closer to
the golden prize of sustained development. Admittedly, its projects are numer-
ous, and taken individually, perhaps accomplish their stated objectives, but in
the big picture they “did not seem to provide a critical mass of results” (CIDA,
2004:12). Infrastructure, governance, and rule of law work very well in Canada,
and are a source of pride. However, to expect that these same qualities will
materialize in the near future under the guise of sustainable development and
good governance in Haiti is a frustrating exercise in humility.
Daudelin (2007) urges a ‘time for modesty’ and cautions Canada’s policy
makers against overreach. Similar to the World Bank’s recommendation, Daudelin
urges CIDA to maintain realistic objectives rather than grandiose ones (Daudelin,
2007:21). Robert Fatton also recognizes the obvious – that “the ‘international
community’ does not have the appetite for long-term ventures in state-building”
(Fatton, 2006:23). This means that expanding CIDA’s role to include an Office
for Democratic Governance, which was created in October 2006, might also fall
into the dustbin of unsuccessful attempts to help Haiti (CIDA, 2007a; Perlin and
Wood, 2007:6). Haiti is still Haiti –with all its political baggage and enduring
poverty. And, Rome was not built in a day.
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